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A famous idea to maintain affordable health expenditures is to cut back statutory health 
insurance (SHI) to a basic insurance and to introduce supplementary private health insurance 
(PHI), permitted to cover the remaining benefits and to apply managed care mechanisms. The 
measure is supposed to lower public health expenditures and to enhance cost efficiency and 
quality of service. To test these reasonings, the paper draws empirical evidence from the 
health systems of Australia, Canada and Switzerland. PHI fails to meet the claims in these 
countries, since it performs worse than SHI concerning cost development and cannot be 
expected to improve quality. Cream skimming and adverse selection arise instead. Therefore, 
regulations and incentives are necessary, but they might counteract the aim of lowering public 
health expenditures. 
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Privatizing social security beneﬁts has been a popular measure in EU countries
over recent years. This is particularly the case for pension systems but also con-
cerns national health ﬁnancing systems. According to the European Commission
(2005, 2008), enforcing private health insurance (PHI) seems to be an appropriate
method in order to enable a rational use of health resources and to maintain af-
fordable health expenditures. Following this rationale, a promising implementation
might be to introduce a basic, statutory health insurance (SHI), supplemented by
voluntary PHI covering additional beneﬁts. Since this is actually not completely
new for most of European’s mixed-ﬁnanced health systems (Mossialos & Thomson
2002b), modiﬁcation refers to the extend to which the basic system is responsible:
In comparison to the status quo SHI—either ﬁnanced by taxes or contributions—
provides signiﬁcantly fewer beneﬁts, leaving a broader ﬁeld for the supplementary
market with private competition-based solutions.
What are the concrete properties of the supplementary PHI scheme? Following
a popular deﬁnition by OECD (2004), supplementary PHI must not cover claims
already covered by basic insurance. Taking this limit into account, the extend of
coverage has to be negotiated by insurer and insuree. Health services neither cov-
ered by SHI nor PHI have to be payed out of pocket (OOP). Furthermore, private
insurers are permitted to use managed care mechanisms, such as selective con-
tracting with health service providers. The approach promises several advantages.
Two of them are mentioned frequently:1
1. The broadening of the market for supplementary PHI and the free conditions
for contracting should comply with intense competition—both among insur-
ers and among health service providers—leading to increased cost eﬃciency
and quality.
2. Reducing beneﬁts of SHI should lower the ﬁnancial burden of the public
system.
This paper relates to the empirical-based literature on public and private health
care markets in general.2 It surveys selected countries regarding the points listed
above, stressing point #1. Main questions of this paper are: Do PHI market
outcomes lead to higher cost eﬃciency and higher quality of service in the private
sector compared to the public sector? What are the impacts of supplementary
1See for example Goldman (1995); Glied (2000); Cutler et al. (2000); Mays et al. (2004); Pati
et al. (2005).
2For examples of recent literature surveying private health care markets in multiple countries,
see in particular OECD (2004); Colombo & Tapay (2004); Mossialos & Thomson (2002a,b);
Greß (2006); Paolucci et al. (2007); Tuohy et al. (2004); Leu et al. (2008).
2PHI markets on public health expenditures? And ﬁnally: What are the lessons
from this survey for EU countries?
The methods applied are the following: First step is to select appropriate coun-
tries and to brieﬂy describe their health system. The paper then follows a struc-
ture, conduct and performance (SCP) framework (Scherer & Ross 1990). However,
SCP is not applied tightly, as to deduct performance straight from structure, but
rather by emphasizing conduct. Since health care markets concern public interests
and have special characteristics, analysis of structure particularly stresses govern-
mental inﬂuences. The SCP approach has already been applied to several health
insurance markets. A recent study by Hammer et al. (2008) uses SCP in order to
analyze the Swiss health market, but focus on SHI. Mossialos & Thomson (2002a)
apply SCP to PHI markets in European Countries, but do not refer to systems
that ﬁt the model described above. Furthermore, their study on performance lacks
a comparison of costs. My paper measures performance of PHI in terms of devel-
opment of costs compared to SHI using macro-data of OECD Health Data 2009
and related national data sources. More precisely, I refer to total expenditures on
health and management expenditures. In order to identify performance in terms
of health service quality and equity concerns, the paper refers to surveys in recent
literature.
2 Selecting appropriate countries
As one purpose of this paper is to deduce lessons for EU governments, the coun-
tries to be surveyed should resemble EU countries concerning standard of living
(expressed by GDP/capita) and life expectancy. A signiﬁcant percentage of popu-
lation should hold supplementary PHI and a signiﬁcant share of total expenditures
on health (TEH) should be claimed by the private sector. Which countries fulﬁl
these conditions? A recent and rather suitable example within EU are the Nether-
lands after health care reform in 2006.3 However, since the new system has been
in progress for just three years, it is too early to draw reliable conclusions within
the framework of this paper. As the scope is to look for expenditure development,
it is no use surveying time series with substantial system changes. Business ar-
eas of PHI and SHI should be staple by and large. Otherwise, time series would
depend on each other, comprising misleading information. Therefore, Australia
(AUS), Canada (CAN) and Switzerland (CH) are left as appropriate objects. Ta-
ble 1 gives an overview of health system relevant country data. It shows that
the three countries match the proposed model. Country data are juxtaposed to
EU(19)-average in order to have a benchmark.
As can be seen, key ﬁgures of the three relevant health insurance schemes are
3See Greß et al. (2007) for a short description.
3Table 1: Country ﬁgures concerning health system for 2006/2007
Country % Covered % of TEHa % Life US$-PPP
SHI PHI SHI PHI OOP TEH/GDP Expect. GDP/cap
AUS 100 51:2 67:7 7:5 18:2 8:7 81:1 35952
CAN 100 67:0 70:7 12:5 14:4 10:0 80:4 36814
CH 100 27:0 59:1 9:1 30:8 11:3 81:7 38119
EU(19)b 97:7 26:0 76:4 6:4 13:1 9:5 79:4 29491
Sources: PHIAC (2009), OECD (2009) and BFS (2008)
a Missing values to 100% belong to further ﬁnancing aggregates, unnecessary within the
scope of this paper.
b Data in some cases are not as precise and not as up to date as for the other countries due
to insuﬃcient availability.
rather similar. Concerning SHI, there is no possibility to opt out of the system,
which ﬁxes coverage at 100%. The Australian and Canadian public health systems
are ﬁnanced almost totally by government. Insurance companies play literally no
role for SHI there. However, in Switzerland they are the primary direct ﬁnancing
agents, responsible for about two-thirds of the Swiss public health expenditures.
Insurers act as competing non-proﬁt organizations in the regulated SHI market.
Nevertheless, expenditures of SHI as a share of TEH are quite in the same range
for the three countries. Although SHI coverage is slightly higher, shares of SHI
expenditures are in each case lower than for EU(19), whereby this ﬁts in with the
presumption of shortened SHI beneﬁts compared to status quo.
PHI coverage diﬀers signiﬁcantly, ranging from 27.0% in Switzerland to 67.0%
in Canada. Considering past development, the Canadian ﬁgure has gradually in-
creased over time. From 1988 to 2006, PHI expenditure grew more rapidly than
OOP expenditure. Private insurance ﬁrms increased their share of private expen-
ditures on health from 29.2% to 40.0%, while the proportion for expenditures OOP
dropped from 58.1% to 48.6% (CIHI 2008). By contrast, coverage in Switzerland
has declined sharply over the last decade, after introducing SHI in 1996. Coverage
fell by more than 15 percentage points over the last 15 years. There had been
a comparable development in Australia. Right after the statutory health system
Medicare was introduced in 1984, PHI coverage dropped by more than 10% from
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Afterwards, governmental counter measures—
particularly subsidies and tax incentives—have brought a trend reversal restoring
the pre-1984 level nowadays. Despite these diﬀerent developments, PHI expendi-
tures as a share of TEH do not diﬀer as much between AUS, CAN and CH. They
all exceed the share for EU(19), regardless there are primary and duplicate PHI
4systems responsible for comprehensive beneﬁts in some EU countries.4 Remark-
ably, in each surveyed country payments OOP play a more important role than
PHI, leaving virtually much space for market expansion. This is particularly the
case for Switzerland.
What are the beneﬁts PHI is responsible for? In Australia, supplementary PHI
can cover outpatient services for dental, optical, chiropractical, and psychological
treatment as well as inpatient services for private beds in private and public hos-
pitals (Colombo & Tapay 2003). Swiss private health insurers provide coverage
for private beds, parts of dental service, aesthetic surgery, and ambulant nursing
(Colombo et al. 2006). Canadians can buy PHI to cover expenses for pharmaceuti-
cals as well as dental, optometrical, psychological, chiropractical, physiotherapeu-
tical, homoeopathical, and home care services (Marchildon 2005; Health Canada
2005). In a nutshell, possible service coverage does not diﬀer much among the
three countries. This helps to compare their systems. It is worth mentioning that
PHI is not just responsible for luxury beneﬁts. Actually, there are essential beneﬁts
among them, which points out, that private health ﬁnancing plays an important
role in these countries.
3 Market structure
This paper does not apply the SCP approach in a very strict manner. Besides the
hart ﬁgures, soft facts and qualitative information are considered. However, to
start with some ﬁgures, have a look at Table 2, which gives a snapshot of market
concentration. On the one hand, there are a couple of insurers in each of the PHI
markets. On the other, markets slightly tend to concentrate and to be dominated,
except for CAN. Both in AUS and CH, the leading insurer controls more than one-
fourth of the market. In both countries a small group of competitors dominates a
major share of contracts. Since health insurance is primarily a business on federal
state level for each of the countries, there might be stronger market concentrations
in some of the states, provinces or cantons, respectively. As Colombo & Tapay
(2003) investigated in an earlier study, some Australian states face regional market
shares of the largest competitor up to 70%.5 Anyhow, the ﬁgures should not cause
worry for two reasons: Firstly, since Kantzenbach (1967) we know that oligopolies
can be highly competitive markets if product diﬀerentiation is low. Secondly, there
is an eﬃciency trade oﬀ in insurance markets concerning market power and risk
pooling. Hence, insurance markets are better of being a little concentrated than
consisting of insurers too small to diversify risks eﬀectively. Altogether, data in
Table 2 show relatively good preconditions for competition.
4Precisely in Germany, UK, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal (OECD 2009).
5Unfortunately there were no federal state level data available for the other countries.
5Table 2: Number of competitors and market share for supple-
mentary PHI
Country # of Market Share
Competitors Largest Comp. 6 Largest Comps.
AUS 38 28.7% 77.7%
CAN 117 < 15% n.a.
CH 79 28.4% 68.0%
Sources: PHIAC (2008), CLHIA (2008), OECD (2009) and BPV
(2009)
Despite the three PHI systems are similar in many respects, they vary in crucial
details. In order to describe market structure, considerable diﬀerences concern
proﬁt orientation of insurers, contracting between insurers and insurees, regulation
of insurers and products, and incentives to take out coverage.
For-proﬁt organizations dominate the Swiss PHI market. Among them are both
independent companies and subsidiaries of the social health insurers.6 By contrast,
in Australia only 7 out of 38 insurers are for-proﬁt organizations (PHIAC 2009).
There is no clear trend for Canada in this regard. However, Canada’s PHI market
stands out on other grounds: Supplementary PHI coverage usually comes with
the job. 97% of contracts are group-based. They are negotiated and payed by the
employer or trade unions (Marchildon 2005). This may explain the high percentage
of PHI coverage shown in Table 1. And it may help to strengthen bargaining power
to moderate contributions and costs. On the contrary, employment based contracts
raise concerns, whether to speak of a voluntary market that enhances individuals
freedom of choice. Such a trade oﬀ between cost containment and ﬂexibility is not
relevant to Australia or Switzerland, where single contracts are predominant.
Concerning governmental inﬂuence, PHI regulation is strictest in Australia: Pri-
vate health insurers have to provide open enrolment, which means that they are
not allowed to refuse applicants. Premia have to be community-rated and cannot
be adjusted to individual risk (except for a certain loading against age, described
below). In order to avoid bad eﬀects of cream skimming and adverse selection
under such a scheme, insurance funds belong to a reinsurance pool for ﬁnancial
equalization of diﬀerent risk structures (Bowie & Adams 2004). Insurers are free to
design new insurance products, but launching and pricing is controlled by Depart-
ment of Health and Ageing (Colombo & Tapay 2003). The measure is to provide
6Since SHI companies themselves are not allowed to make proﬁt, many of them founded sub-
sidiaries for the supplementary PHI market, where generating proﬁts is permitted.
6freedom of choice and concomitantly to counteract risk segmentation through the
back-door by launching products attractive for low risk groups only. Coverage
contracts are not temporary, which spares insurees expensive contract prolonga-
tion at higher age (and thus, higher risk). Switching the insurer must be possible
throughout the year, so as to force competition. All these points of regulation are
actually more common to SHI than PHI. This points out the social responsibility,
PHI is meant to assume in Australia. By contrast, none of the mentioned require-
ments are known to the Canadian or Swiss PHI market. They conduct in a rather
unregulated framework which allows them to adjust premia to individual risk and
to refuse high risks. While this raises equity concerns (Colombo & Tapay 2004;
OECD 2004), these markets may be more eﬃcient to contain health expenditures.
Whether empirical evidence conﬁrms an equality-eﬃciency trade oﬀ will be ana-
lyzed later on. So far, one is just able to divide the countries into two groups, the
strictly regulated (AUS) and the rather unregulated (CAN & CH).
This ﬁnding is correlated to another public inﬂuence on the private markets,
namely incentives. Incentives to take out supplementary PHI appear in each of the
three countries, but their amount and design diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Australia intro-
duced the most substantial incentives to PHI in order to stop decreasing coverage.
Since 1997, the government is subsidizing the system by rebating contributions of
persons who take out or already hold PHI. Initially, those subsidies were available
only to low and medium income earners. However, since 1999 a 30% rebate on
premia is being provided to all private health insurants. Moreover, Australia im-
plemented an SHI levy surcharge to high income earners, who are not covered by
PHI. In 2001, an inducement for people to maintain PHI coverage for entire life
was established. This takes the form of a 2% loading for each year that a person
exceeds 30 years of age at the time of joining a PHI fund. However, the maximum
loading is capped to 70% (OECD 2009). Government established this incentive
to make PHI attractive for low risks, mediating a better risk pool. In Switzerland
there are only some tax deductions for insurees’ contributions (Colombo et al.
2006). Canadian provinces oﬀer tax deductibles for employers, buying PHI for
their employees. Some provinces also subsidize some private services (Marchildon
2005). But in fact, if one is to build groups by the attribute of public incentives
they are not supposed to diﬀer from groups by the attribute regulation. Aus-
tralian PHI faces considerable incentives, whereas Canadian and Swiss PHI do not
as much.
4 Market conduct
This section looks at the behavior of market participants within the scope of market
structure. It describes direct impacts of certain structures and policy measures.
7A major ﬁnding is that despite the relative good preconditions, competition in
the surveyed PHI markets is low. In each of the three countries, PHI market
consolidates as the number of insurers shrinks. From 2006 to 2007, the Canadian
market decreased by nine competitors (CLHIA 2007; 2008). A similar trend can be
found for Australia (PHIAC 2009). Consolidation progressed even more sharply
in Switzerland, since from 122 insurers in 2004 only 79 are left in 2008. Hefti &
Frey (2008) suppose this trend to go on, which might become a problem in the
future.
For present issues, switching of insurers as a key ﬁgure for health market com-
petition turns out to be rare. A reason for this might be age reserves for PHI
contributions. Usually, younger people taking out PHI pay in the ﬁrst years of
contract much more than they beneﬁt in these years, in order to build age reserves
for retirement years when they need more services at lower income. Insurees in
high and middle ages face the problem that age reserves cannot be transferred
to other insurers, generating high transaction costs of switching. For the special
case of Switzerland, switching is additionally hindered by the double role of some
insurers in SHI and PHI market. Despite social health insurers have to run their
PHI activities in separate business units, separation is often not obvious to cus-
tomers. Therefore, most of them take out SHI and PHI coverage at the same fund
(BFS 2009), which ties them to their private health insurer and lowers switching
probability (Beck et al. 2003). Furthermore, customer data collected in SHI may
be used for marketing purposes in PHI (Leu et al. 2008). Also, PHI undesirably
retroacts to SHI: While medical examination is not allowed in SHI it is a valid tool
of risk selection in PHI. Thus, collected data in PHI may help to separate risks in
SHI (Paolucci et al. 2007; Hammer et al. 2008; Dormont et al. 2009).
Weak competition is forwarded through insurers, segmenting the market by
product diﬀerentiation. While this is advertised to enhance consumer choice, the
measure intrinsically helps to classify risks. Australian insurers oﬀer diﬀerentiated
polices to select risks by demand (self-selection), as they are forbidden to refuse
applicants. In 2003, there were more than 1600 PHI products available (Colombo
& Tapay 2003). Apparently, the risk structure equalization scheme leaves some
gaps for cream skimming, since it is calculated only by age and gender. If people
self select by choosing a certain contract, insurers gain an edge of information over
the risk equalization scheme. Swiss private health insurers segment their market as
well, oﬀering about 2000 diﬀerent polices in 2008. But the usual way to select risks
in unregulated markets is to examine the applicants’ health before contracting.
Canadian and Swiss insurers are bound to apply this expensive method, as they
ﬁnd themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma, raising administrative costs in order to
avoid adverse selection. If some would not examine applicants, but some of them
do, the former would attract all the bad risks, leading to higher expenses and thus
to higher contributions, making themselves unattractive to better risks. Therefore,
8insurers in the unregulated markets rather compete by selecting good risks than
oﬀering better service or being more eﬃcient in administration. Since there is open
enrolment and community rating in Australia, health tests are not applied there.
However, the Australian scheme bears other problems leading to adverse selection
as well. While supplementary PHI is not mandatory but community rated, low
risks ﬁnd themselves better oﬀ opting out of coverage and paying on demand,
leaving a pool with higher average risk behind (Paolucci et al. 2008). The problem
occurs (to a lesser extend) to the other countries as well, since their PHI markets
face information asymmetries between applicants and funds too.7
As stated at the beginning of this paper, broadening the ﬁeld for supplemen-
tary PHI is supposed to enable selective contracting between insurers and health
service providers. Private health insurers are allowed to negotiate service prices
and refuse expensive or low-quality providers (Newhouse 1982). In comparison
to simple reimbursement schemes, the measure should enforce quality and price
competition of providers. Moreover, the active role of insurers is supposed to
constrain over-utilization of health resources by customers. In fact, none of the
surveyed PHI markets applies selective contracting or other measures of managed
care, although they are permitted to. All funds serve as passive indemnity in-
surers. There may be at least three causes to that—two are supply-driven, the
third one is demand-driven. Each group of stakeholders (insurers, providers, in-
surees) is involved: Firstly, insurers business area could be too small. That does
not allow for high expenditures to benchmark quality, own investments to improve
quality and bilateral negotiations (OECD 2004). Secondly, providers might refuse
to negotiate prices on a bilateral level, as this would weaken their position, while
augmenting their administrative eﬀort (Nichols et al. 2004). Thirdly, customers
demand supplementary PHI in order to enhance their freedom of choice and not
to be restricted by their insurer. Hence, funds avoid oﬀering restricted contracts.
Whatever the reasons might be, empirical evidence in this survey refutes two
central reasonings to widen PHI responsiveness: Insurers do not play an active role
in health service management as they do not employ managed care mechanisms.
Moreover, funds do not compete as supposed to, since switching is low and cream
skimming is in place. Hence, quality improvements and cost eﬃciency can not be
7Therefore, adverse selection is one factor to explain the idle market space for PHI displayed
in Table 1 by the high share of OOP payments vs. PHI expenditures. Another factor might
be that many people cannot eﬀort PHI and thus have to pay OOP when it comes to injury
uncovered by SHI. In Canada, where PHI coverage is primarily employment linked, coverage
underlies further obstacles, e.g. for the unemployed. Moreover, there are some business areas,
such as co-payments, PHI must not cover and there might be some unproﬁtable business areas,
insurers eschew to cover. Historical reasons may matter as well, since e.g. Swiss people have
only been covered by a SHI since 1996. Financing health expenditures OOP is familiar to
them.
9expected from widening the ﬁeld for PHI. The next section deals with measuring
these expectations.
5 Market performance
This section looks at outcomes of competition concerning cost development and
quality of service. To start with some pecuniary factors, see Figures 1 and 2. For
each of the three countries, these ﬁgures compare expenditures of PHI vs. SHI.
While Figure 1 displays TEH per insuree against time in order to express the
development of contributions (or public expenses under a tax ﬁnanced scheme),
Figure 2 displays management expenses per insuree against time in order to express
cost eﬃciency.8 The left column of charts in each ﬁgure contains nominal costs.
They are included as additional information to get a picture of the cost levels.
However, it would be no use to draw comparison on these nominal grounds, as
they are level-dependent. For TEH per insuree, SHI has a much higher level,
since it covers more beneﬁts. For management expenditures per insuree, PHI has
a higher level, since there are additional expenditures for advertising etc., SHI
may not face. This is why the right column of charts abstracts from levels and
displays the development as an index with a basic year in order to make time
series comparable. In fact this means, the ﬁgures compare cost developments,
more precisely, accumulated growth rates of total expenditures and management
expenditures of SHI and PHI for the longest available time series.
Concerning TEH, these data can not provide information about which one is
cheaper in covering certain services, since these are just trends, and since PHI and
SHI—by deﬁnition—do not have any covered services in common. But they are
an indicator for what would have been the total costs, if any randomly chosen
marginal service unit, currently covered by SHI, would have been covered by PHI,
and vice versa.9 Administrative task areas of SHI and PHI are not as discret as
covered beneﬁts. In fact they coincide in several respects. Moreover, the levels of
ME per insuree are pretty much the same. Hence, these series show, which one
developed more eﬃciently in recent years.
What are the major ﬁndings of the comparison? Concerning TEH per insuree,
PHI and SHI shape up with a slower growth for SHI in two of three countries,
and rather similar for the third. The indexed time series have been tested for
8Unfortunately, data could not be collected for the same period of time for each country. The
ﬁgures display the longest continuously available time series. Within these years, responsive-
ness for beneﬁts did not change substantial in the three countries.
9The dichotomy of beneﬁts covered by SHI and PHI is actually advantageous, as data are not
biased by cross-subsidizing from PHI patients to SHI patients, which in fact occurs in systems
with primary or duplicate PHI.
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Figure 1: Total expenditures on health per insuree and year
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Figure 2: Management expenses per insuree and year
12equality of means.10 Means are signiﬁcantly higher for PHI than SHI in Canada
and Switzerland. The tests reject equality on a 5% level. For Australia, means of
TEH per insuree show no signiﬁcant diﬀerence. TEH grow faster for PHI before the
considerable break in the time series and grow slower afterwards. Responsiveness of
services did not change signiﬁcantly over the considered period. Thus, it must have
been prices that grew at a faster rate for PHI than for SHI. One might put these
changes in relative prices down to changes in relative costs for the basket of services
covered by PHI to those covered by SHI. Hence, one would doubt comparability
of cost eﬀectiveness along these ﬁgures. But this is only half the truth, since
introducing PHI was meant to contain costs of services, which particularly includes
negotiating moderate prices. Thus, as far as private health insurers perform worse
than SHI in containing the price of any randomly chosen marginal beneﬁt unit,
shrinking the latter in favor of the former does not pay oﬀ from an expenditure
point of view. Similar studies (Mossialos & Thomson 2002a; Greß 2005) conﬁrm
these empirical ﬁndings for some European countries with diﬀerent roles for PHI
in their health system. Additionally, they ﬁnd quality of service to be better
enhanced by bargaining power of SHI.
Results are more distinct for management expenditures. As shown in Figure 2,
administrative costs per insuree for PHI develop worse compared to SHI in two of
three countries (CAN & CH) and develop similar in the third (AUS). Statistical
tests verify these ﬁrst impressions, since means diﬀer signiﬁcantly on a 5% level
for CAN and CH, and do not for AUS. CIHI (2008) and (Mossialos & Thomson
2002b) announced analogous results for Canada and some European Countries.
Economic theory considers high transaction costs to be ineﬃcient if they can be
avoided under an alternative system of funding and providing health care (Barr
1992). Thus, empirical evidence does not support expansion of PHI, but rather
repelling it.
Australia plays a special role among the surveyed countries. It is the only
country where PHI can compete with SHI concerning development of TEH and ME
per insuree in recent years. Concurrently, Australia applies the strictest regulation,
the largest public impact to take out PHI, and the lowest share of proﬁt-oriented
insurers. In a nutshell, it has the PHI scheme with the highest aﬃnity to an SHI
scheme. As insurers do not use health tests, they are able to release management
expenses. In general, funds save costs for risk selection in comparison to the
other countries. Thus, there is no regulation-eﬃciency trade oﬀ. At the same
time, Australia stresses equality in PHI coverage like no other surveyed country
(Colombo & Tapay 2003, 2004; OECD 2004). Taking this into account, empirical
evidence shows no equality-eﬃciency trade oﬀ between unregulated and regulated
PHI markets. Both aims are better met by regulated schemes.
10See the statistical appendix for details of the tests.
13If one is to look at the Australian chart in Figure 1 again, the break in the
time series around 1999 attracts attention. It causes PHI to grow slower than
SHI concerning TEH per insuree in subsequent years. The break is due to several
measures at the end of the 1990s to encourage demand for PHI. Before these
interventions, coverage fell rapidly and the PHI market was likely to break down by
reason of adverse selection. As incentives worked and coverage grew fast, adverse
selection could be curtailed and thus, contributions per insuree could fall. Hence,
the rather good performance of Australian PHI is largely put down to subsidies
and tax incentives. Maybe public expenses were lower, if supplementary services
were covered by SHI, saving subsidies and costs of regulation.11 The question, if
subsidies are worth it, should be looked at in more detail in future research.
6 Conclusions
The paper aimed to test the widespread opinion that shrinking beneﬁts of SHI in
favor of PHI is likely to enable a rational use of health resources and to maintain
aﬀordable health expenditures. Thus, it surveyed health systems that promote a
distinct role for PHI and strictly separate responsibilities between PHI and SHI,
assigning SHI the role of a basic insurance and PHI the role of a supplementary
insurance. Empirical evidence derives from the health insurance schemes of Aus-
tralia, Canada and Switzerland that permit voluntary supplementary insurance in
a regime with a mandatory basic insurance package. Coverable beneﬁts do not
diﬀer very much, which makes the systems comparable.
Although market structures provide relatively good grounds for competition,
markets conduct and perform not in the desired way. Insurers do not compete
by quality or cost eﬀectiveness, as they lack power to curtail costs of service and
lack the incentive to utilize selective contracting or other measures of managed
care. Since private health insurers in fact do not apply methods of active care
management in any of the surveyed countries, no quality improvements or cost
containments can be expected. Far from it, insurers ﬁnd themselves in a prisoners’
dilemma. They bear high expenses to select risks by health tests and product
diﬀerentiation in order to avoid adverse selection against their competitors.
These ﬁndings come along with weak market performance in recent years, as to-
tal expenditures on health and management expenditures (both per insuree) grow
11Besides preventing the supplementary PHI market to break down, subsidies had another aim:
They should lower expenditures on public hospitalization, by shifting demand to the private
sector, as PHI covers private hospitalization (Walker et al. 2007). However, this did not come
true. While the measure can be called eﬀective in supporting PHI in this scheme, it failed
to lower the utilization of public services and therefore unburden the public budget.(Paolucci
et al. 2008) In fact subsidies generated, rather than merely shifted, demand for health (Moorin
& Holman 2006). Therefore, subsidies might cause higher costs than they save.
14faster in comparison to SHI in two of the three countries. Thus, assuming any
randomly chosen marginal beneﬁt unit, currently covered by SHI, to have been
covered by PHI in these years would have led to higher total health costs. Hence,
shrinking beneﬁts of SHI in favor of PHI seems not to be a measure to improve cost
eﬃciency. Comparing management expenditures yields similar results. Since they
grow faster for PHI accruing from a higher level, they do not support introduction
of PHI by reasons of cost containment. Only the health system of Australia, where
accumulated growth rates of PHI expenditures keep up with those of SHI, stands
out from these ﬁndings. However, private insurance contracts are strictly regu-
lated and intensively subsidized there, whereby PHI resembles SHI, stressing the
importance of equality in the Australian PHI market. Unregulated PHI markets
on the other hand lack equality, but do not yield better cost containment. Thus,
there seems to be no trade oﬀ between equality and eﬃciency, making no good
case for introducing lowly regulated PHI markets.
As either PHI performs worse than SHI or it has to be strictly regulated and
subsidized by government, it is questionable whether introducing or forcing sup-
plementary PHI is a useful measure to contain TEH. Shifting responsiveness from
public to private sector in order to lower public expenditures, requires high sub-
sidies that might even exceed the savings. If equal access to services and high
coverage of certain services are health policy aims, it seems to be more eﬀective
to have them covered by SHI. If high coverage is not that favored, supplemen-
tary PHI might be a solution, but regulation has to be strict to promote equality
and eﬀectiveness. Experience from Australia shows that adverse selection can be
defeated by moderate incentives to take out PHI.
To sum up, the two points listed in the ﬁrst section can now be evaluated:
1. Free markets for supplementary PHI in this survey do not comply with in-
tense competition—neither amongst insurers nor health service providers.
They do not enforce higher quality or lower growth of costs, but risk selec-
tion. SHI schemes have performed better concerning costs over the last years.
Only regulated PHI schemes could keep up with SHI. Additionally, SHI and
regulated PHI guarantee more equality than unregulated PHI schemes.
2. Reducing beneﬁts of SHI and widening the ﬁeld of PHI has to be accommo-
dated by subsidies and might not shift, but only generate further demand for
health services. Therefore, public cost containment is at least questionable.
Further research is needed at this point.
Empirical evidence shows the obstacles of introducing PHI in practice and cau-
tions policy makers about setting eﬀective regulation and moderate incentives.
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19Statistical Appendix
The following list shows statistical tests concerning equality of means of the in-
dexed time series (right columns of Figures 1 and 2). Signiﬁcant p-values (p < 0:05)
indicate considerable diﬀerences between two time series, respectively. Data were
tested and put out with the statistical software R.
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meantest$TEH_AUS_PHI and meantest$TEH_AUS_SHI
t = 0.1603, df = 33.323, p-value = 0.8736
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-35.30451 41.34545
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
177.6316 174.6111
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meantest$TEH_CAN_PHI and meantest$TEH_CAN_SHI
t = 2.1257, df = 29.765, p-value = 0.04194
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
1.152207 58.070015
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
166.0000 136.3889
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meantest$TEH_CH_PHI and meantest$TEH_CH_SHI
t = 2.1297, df = 24.738, p-value = 0.04334
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
0.6689659 40.6167484
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
150.7143 130.0714
20Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meantest$ME_AUS_PHI and meantest$ME_AUS_SHI
t = -0.0333, df = 30.544, p-value = 0.9737
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-30.45222 29.47561
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
157.7895 158.2778
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meantest$ME_CAN_PHI and meantest$ME_CAN_SHI
t = 2.3002, df = 30.292, p-value = 0.02850
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
4.893647 82.106353
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
188.7222 145.2222
Welch Two Sample t-test
data: meantest$ME_CH_PHI and meantest$ME_CH_SHI
t = 6.4886, df = 13.14, p-value = 1.938e-05
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
40.49927 80.86337
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
168.5385 107.8571
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